Abstract. Many recent studies have looked at the macroeconomic, cultural and institutional determinants of corruption at the cross-national level. Using enterprise-level data on bribes paid to utilities in 21 transition economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, we examine how characteristics of the utilities taking bribes and the firms paying bribes affect the equilibrium level of corruption in the sector. Bribe takers (utility employees) are more likely to take bribes in countries with greater constraints on utility capacity, lower levels of competition in the utility sector, and where utilities are state-owned. Bribe payers (enterprises) are more likely to pay bribes when they are more profitable, have greater overdue payment to utilities, and are de novo private firms. Our study has several advantages over most existing studies. First, it uses an objective measure of corruption, rather than a subjective measure. Second, the large firm-level sample, which includes firms from multiple countries, allows us to examine both firm-level and national factors that might affect corruption. Finally, we are able to examine the behavior of both bribe takers and bribe payers.
INTRODUCTION
Since the pioneering papers on corruption and rent seeking in the sixties and seventies (Becker, 1968 , Becker and Stigler, 1974 , Krueger, 1974 , Leff, 1964 , Rose-Ackerman, 1975 , Rose-Ackerman, 1978 , many studies have looked at the determinants and consequences of corruption. While some authors have seen bribes either as "grease money" that lubricates the squeaky wheels of rigid bureaucracy and commerce (Huntington, 1968 , Leff, 1964 or as a substitute price mechanism that restores optimal allocation in the market (Lui, 1985 , Olson, 2000 , most have viewed corruption less positively.
1 Consistent with the less flattering view of corruption, recent empirical studies have found that corruption hampers growth, reduces investment and income, increases inequality, and increases the size of the unofficial economy (Friedman, et al., 2000 , Li, et al., 2000 , Mauro, 1995 , Murphy, et al., 1993 .
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The literature on the economic effect of corruption has been supplemented with a large literature on the determinants of corruption. Although results vary to some degree, recent studies have found that corruption is lower in countries that are more open to foreign trade; have protestant traditions and were formerly British colonies; have a longer exposure to democracy; are more democratic; are more political stability and have greater freedom of the press; are characterized by fiscal decentralization, and have parliamentary systems (see, for example, Ades and Di Tella, 1999 , Fisman and Gatti, 2002 , Knack and Azfar, 2000 , Kunicova, 2001 , Lederman, et al., 2001 , Treisman, 2000 , Wei, 2000 .
Although this paper fits into the existing literature on the determinants of corruption, it complements it in several ways. First, rather than subjective survey data, this paper uses objective measures of the level and prevalence of bribes. Second, rather than using country-level data, we combine firm-level data in 21 countries, allowing us to simultaneously look at the characteristics of enterprises that do, and do not, pay bribes along with national characteristics.
Finally, rather than focusing on the overall level of corruption in the economy, we look at bribes in a single sector -infrastructure. This allows us to look at characteristics of the utilities receiving bribes, something that previous papers on the determinants of corruption have not been able to do.
For infrastructure enterprises receiving bribes, we look at whether the bribes are affected by utility capacity, competition and ownership -factors that might affect either the internal incentives of the utility companies or the ability of their employees to demand bribes. In addition, we also look at how ownership of the bribe-paying enterprise and the nature of the enterprises' relationship with the utility affect the equilibrium bribe payment. Finally, as in
Svensson (2003), we look at whether the enterprises' ability-to-pay affects the bribe payment.
The empirical results are largely consistent with the conceptual framework. We find that bribe payments are lower and less common in countries where infrastructure is better developed, suggesting that excess demand is an important determinant of corruption. Greater competition in the telecommunications sector, measured by the number of cellular operators in the country, also reduces the level and prevalence of bribe payments. Finally, we find that bribes are lower and less common in countries with privately owned utilities. One explanation for this is that private owners might have a greater incentive than public managers to impose penalties upon employees taking bribes.
Characteristics of the enterprise paying the bribe also affect payments. Enterprises that are more profitable are more likely to pay bribes and pay higher bribes than less profitable enterprises -a result that is consistent with both the queuing (Lui, 1985) and the endogenous harassment (Myrdal, 1968) theories of corruption. 3 Also consistent with the two theories, firms with higher overdue payments to utilities pay higher bribes. Under the endogenous harassment theory, having overdue payments weakens the firm's bargaining position when utility employees threaten to disconnect them if they fail to pay bribes because it makes the utility employee's threat to cut the connection more credible. However, under the queuing or 'speed money' hypothesis, overdue payments increase the enterprise manager's incentive to offer a bribe;
enterprises with large overdue payment will have more to gain from paying off the utility employees because their utility bills will be larger if they fail to bribe the employee.
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we discuss factors that might affect the bribes that enterprises pay to utility employees. We first examine characteristics of bribe takers (i.e., utility companies) such as service capacity, ownership and competition. We then shift to bribe payers (enterprises in this analysis), looking at financial performance, relative bargaining strength, and the length of the enterprise's relationship with the utility companies.
II.1. Characteristics of Bribe Takers
If there is excess demand for utility service -for example if there is a price ceiling or if limits on public investment have historically limited system expansion -there will be rents associated with access. Consequently, if utility employees have discretion over who gets connected or has broken down connections repaired, they will be able to demand side payments in return for reduced wait periods. Since enterprises will be more willing to pay bribes when excess demand is higher, we expect bribes to utilities to be more common when this is the case.
3 This is consistent with results for Uganda in Svensson (2003) . Svensson (2003) finds that enterprises that are more profitable and that have greater difficulty reallocating their capital to alternate activities pay higher bribes. Our paper complements Svensson's (2003) in a number of ways. First, while he focuses on how ability-to-pay affects bribe payments -an issue we also examine -we focus on the roles of ownership and competition. Second, his paper does not examine the characteristics of bribe takers. Third, while his data set consists of roughly 200 firms from a single country, ours has roughly 2000 firms in 21 transition economies, allowing us to also examine features of the country-level institutional environment. Finally, we focus on corruption among utility employees, while Svensson (2003) focuses on bureaucrats.
Since utility privatization is often associated with an increase in investment and a large expansion of capacity (Li and Xu, 2001 , Ros, 1999 , Wallsten, 2001 , it should reduce bribe payments by reducing capacity constraints. However, it also might affect how management deals with corrupt employees. When a company is privatized, the private owners become residual claimants on the income of the company, giving them an incentive to reduce corruption among employees (Olson, 2000, Chapter 6 ). In contrast, since it is often unclear who the residual claimants are under public ownership (e.g., whether the Treasury, political leaders, or the utility itself is the residual claimant), there might be less pressure on management to reduce corruption under public ownership. Although, in theory, profits accrue to the general public under public ownership, an individual would receive only 1/Nth (where N is the number of citizens) of the benefit of her monitoring but would pay the entire cost (Olson, 2000) .
Consequently, she would have a strong incentive to free ride off the efforts of others.
Other aspects of public ownership might also encourage corruption. In general,
principal-agent problems between owners and managers might be worse in public enterprises, for example because it is difficult to tie managers' salaries to profits under civil service pay schemes or to reward public managers with stock or stock options (Laffont and Tirole, 1991, Shirley and Xu, 1998) . Under these circumstances, and especially if side-payments from corrupt employees are possible, managers might not be willing to exert much effort to reduce corruption. Finally, in countries where inflation or pay freezes have eroded salaries in public utilities, threats to fire corrupt employees will be less effective. These factors, combined with greater monitoring by private owners relative to public owners, will mean that privatization should reduce corruption even if it fails to reduce excess demand.
Competition in the utility sector should also reduce corruption. Increased competition should increase the total supply of infrastructure services (relative to supply under a monopoly), because monopolists have incentives to restrict output. More importantly, when there are multiple service providers, utility customers can respond to bribe demands by switching providers. Anticipating this, utility employees might be less likely to ask for bribes or to ask for lower amounts when competition is greater (Ades and Di Tella, 1999 , Rose-Ackerman, 1978 .
II.2. Characteristics of Bribe Givers
So far we have focused on the bribe taker, the utility companies. However, characteristics of bribe payers, the firms demanding utility service, might also affect bribes. The simplest theory about the behavior of utility customers is the "speed money" or efficiency theory of bribes (Barzel, 1974 , Huntington, 1968 , Leff, 1964 , Lui, 1985 . Under this hypothesis, firms that benefit more from utility service will be more likely to offer bribes for reduced wait periods for connection or repairs. Consequently, utility service would be allocated according to the value that different enterprises place on service, with bribes acting as an efficient price discrimination mechanism. Although the benefit that an individual firm gains from utility services is unobservable, it is reasonable to assume that more profitable firms will benefit more from utility service and consequently, would be more likely to pay bribes.
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The endogenous harassment theory, suggested in Myrdal (1968) and further elaborated in Kaufmann and Wei (1999) , also suggests that profitability should be correlated with bribe payments. Under this hypothesis, utility employees use observable information such as industry, size, or profitability to guess enterprises' willingness-to-pay for service, and then endogenously offer incentive-compatible bribes that depend on these characteristics. Although the basic ingredient in both the speed money and the endogenous harassment hypotheses is that willingnessto-pay bribes increases with profitability, utility employees need more information under the endogenous harassment hypothesis. In the speed money hypothesis the enterprise paying the bribe decides how much it is willing to pay according to its cost of waiting. In contrast, the endogenous harassment hypothesis requires that utility employees discriminate between enterprises and, therefore, requires them to have information on firm characteristics, such as profitability, that affect willingness-to-pay.
A second implication of the endogenous harassment theory is that willingness-to-pay bribes can be affected by the enterprise's overdue payments to the utility company -something that is common among enterprises in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 5 In bilateral bargaining between the utility employee and the enterprise, enterprises with significant overdue payments have worse fallback positions, and, hence, weaker bargaining power, making it easier for the utility employee to extract bribes. Since utility employees will generally be able to observe enterprises' overdue payments to utilities, enterprises with overdue payments should generally be more likely to pay bribes and to pay higher bribes than other enterprises. The speed money hypothesis suggests a similar association. Since enterprises with overdue payments will benefit more from paying bribes than enterprises without overdue payments, they will generally benefit the most from paying off the person in charge of collection.
Offsetting these tendencies, enterprises with overdue payments are likely to suffer from cash flow problems that reduce their ability to pay bribes, potentially resulting in a negative correlation between overdue payments (of all types) and bribes under both hypotheses. Consequently, to the extent that overdue payments to workers signal cash flow problems, we might expect enterprises with large overdue payments to workers to have lower ability to pay bribes. Further, in contrast to overdue payments to utilities, overdue payments to workers will generally not affect the firm's bargaining position vis-à-vis the utility (i.e., utility employees will not be able to threaten the enterprise with cutoffs just because it owes money to workers). However, if the other variables included in the analysis (e.g., profitability) adequately control for the cash-flow situation of the enterprise, we might find no relationship between arrears to workers and bribes to utilities. Under the endogenous harassment hypothesis we might find no relationship for a second reason. Since bribes are only affected by factors that are easily observable to the bribe taker (i.e., the utility employee) and given that overdue payments to workers will be harder for utility employees to observe than overdue payments to utilities, it is less likely that they will affect bribe payments. In summary, we would expect to find a positive relationship between overdue payments to utilities and bribes to utilities, but a negative relationship or no relationship between overdue payments to workers and bribes to utilities.
The relationship between the enterprise paying the bribe and the utility receiving the bribe might also affect bribe payments. We conjecture that de novo private enterprise might pay higher bribes than other enterprises. First, if de novo private firms are more profitable than other enterprises (and to the extent that the other variables fail to control for this), we would expect them to be more likely to pay bribes. 6 Similarly, we would expect state-owned enterprises to be less likely to pay bribes. Second, de novo private enterprises might be more vulnerable to bribe demands because they tend to have less political influence (e.g., with judges and local politicians) than managers of established, especially state-owned, enterprises. Consequently, managers of de novo enterprises might be less able to resist bribe demands than other managers, while managers of state-owned enterprises might be better able to resist bribe demands. A final reason why de novo enterprises might be more likely to pay bribes is that when it is unclear whether the relationship between the utility employee and the de novo company will turn into a long-term one, utility employees might behave like "roving bandits", extracting as much from the de novo enterprise as quickly as possible (Olson, 2000) . When the relationship becomes consolidated over time, utility employees might become "stationary bandits", internalizing the costs imposed by current bribe taking, and in so doing, reducing bribe demands (Olson, 2000) . However, because individual utility employees are but one of the many beneficiaries of lower bribes, it is possible that this channel will have only a minor impact -the typical stationary bandit in Olson's (2000) exposition has monopoly power to collect taxes or bribes within a region and so completely internalizes the cost of bribetaking. To summarize, we expect de novo private firms to be more likely to pay bribes and to pay higher bribes than other types of firms.
Firm growth might also affect bribe payments by signaling strong firm performanceespecially since investment is often financed through retained earnings -and thus might be correlated with increased bribes. However, other factors might work in the opposite direction, making the relationship between bribe payment and firm growth ambiguous. If utility employees behave like 'stationary bandits', they might be less likely to demand bribes or demand lower bribes to encourage rapid firm growth and increase the potential for future bribes. Yet, as argued earlier, utility employees are unlikely to take the adverse effects of current bribes on future firm growth into account since they will generally be only minor beneficiaries of future firm growth. Although it is difficult to get a representative sample of firms in countries where the quality of information on the universe of firms is poor, one of the goals of the WBES was to generate representative data that could be used for cross-country comparisons. To try to achieve this, the WBES employed a uniform sampling method across countries and attempted to collect information from a representative sample of firms within each country. The first stage of the data collection was to generate a suitable sample frame for enterprises within each country based upon enterprise size, sector of operations, and location in the country. In addition to setting these sampling frames, additional quotas were imposed to ensure that certain types of enterprises were represented. For example, the additional requirements included requirements that at least 15 percent of enterprises had over 200 employees, at least 15 percent had under 50 employees, at least 15 percent were located in rural areas, at least 20 percent were state-owned, and at least 15 percent were exporters. Government registers of enterprises were the primary source of enterprises might perform better than state-owned enterprises and present evidence that they do.
information used to construct the sample frames. Once the sampling frame was complete, firms were selected randomly from business directories. An initial screening questionnaire was conducted to ensure that the correct number of enterprises was included in each category. After this had been done and the co-operation of the firm had been secured, interviewers carried out face-to-face interviews with the enterprise managers. To ensure consistency in training and approach across countries within Eastern Europe and Central Asia, a single international firm, A.C. Nielsen, conducted the interviews in the entire region.
Although a core survey was conducted in all countries where the WBES was conducted, additional regional specific modules were added, with questions that regional policymakers were especially interested in. For the purpose of this study, the most important differences between the surveys were that questions on profitability (margins) and overdue payments to utilities and the questions that allow us to calculate the amount of bribes paid to utilities were asked only in the transition economies. Consequently, we focus on this region. The sample includes about 2000 enterprises from 21 transition economies. (2000). Table 2 and Table 3 provide detailed sources, brief descriptions and summary statistics for the individual variables used in this analysis. 7 The countries in the sample for transition economies are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
III.2 Dependent Variable
Rather than using a subjective measure on the extent of corruption in the utilities sectoras in most existing empirical studies of corruption-we construct two objective measures using data from the WBES. The first variable is a measure of the amount of 'unofficial payments' paid to utilities (as a share of enterprise revenues), calculated using answers from two questions in the WBES -the percent of revenues paid per annum in 'unofficial' payments to public officials (including to the employees of electricity and telecommunications companies) and the share of those unofficial payments that were spent 'to get connected to and maintain public services (electricity and telephone)'. The enterprise manager's response to the first question about total unofficial payments was categorical (i.e., 0% of revenues; less than 1%; between 1 and 1.99%; between 2 and 9.99%; between 10 and 12%; between 13 and 25%; and over 25%), while the manager's response to the second question was any number between 0 and 100% (of total 'unofficial payments'). From this information, it is possible to calculate a range for the percent of revenues that each enterprise reported paying to electricity and telecommunications utilities.
One concern about this measure is that it might be difficult to get enterprise managers to honestly respond to questions about bribes. To encourage honest responses to questions about bribery, and to allow enterprise managers to avoid implicating themselves when answering questions about frequency and level of bribe payments, the WBES asked about bribes paid by 'firms like yours' rather than about the manager's own firm. In the empirical analysis, we assume that the manager was answering the question for a firm similar to the manager's own enterprise in terms of the independent variables.
A second concern is that this variable is likely to be poorly measured. It is constructed by multiplying numbers from two separate questions, both of which enterprise managers might find it difficult to answer accurately (i.e., in addition to accurately recalling amounts, the two answers require mental arithmetic on the part of the manager). Therefore, we also construct a simple dummy variable that represents whether the enterprise manager reported paying bribes to utilities or not. Although it might be difficult for a manager to know exactly how much was paid in any given year, it seems likely that he will have a reasonable idea about whether any bribes were paid (i.e., whether the answer to the first or second question was zero). In practice, the empirical results are very similar for the two measures.
About 24 percent of enterprises reported paying bribes to utilities. Of these, most paid relatively modestly amounts. About 94 percent of enterprises reported an upper bound for bribes to utilities of less than 2.0 percent of revenues. 8 The share of enterprises that reported paying bribes to utilities varied between countries. The countries where the most enterprises reported paying bribes were Azerbaijan (54 percent), Romania (49 percent) and Albania (43 percent).
The countries where the fewest enterprises reported paying bribes were Estonia (6 percent), Hungary (8 percent) and Slovenia (10 percent). At a regional level enterprises in countries that were among the early applicants to the EU (Czech Republic, Estonia Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) were the least likely to report paying bribes to utilities, while enterprises in SouthEastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania) were the most likely (see Figure 1 ).
8 Note that although we know that an enterprise that reports an upper bound of less that 2 percent definitely paid less than 2 percent of revenues as bribes (ignoring reporting errors), it does not follow that these enterprises necessarily paid over 2 percent of revenues in bribes to utilities. For example, an enterprise that paid 1.2 percent of revenues in bribes could report lower and upper bounds of 1 and 6 percent (i.e., the actual level of bribes is between the two bounds). Only 0.3 percent of enterprises reported lower bounds greater than 5 percent of revenues (i.e., only 0.3 percent of enterprises reported ranges that were entirely above 5 percent of revenues) and no enterprises reported a lower bound greater than 8 percent of revenues. subjective indices might suffer from large noise-to-signal ratios. 9 Moreover, there might be systematic errors due to cognitive problems, social desirability of answers, non-attitudes, wrong attitudes, and soft attitudes , Sudman, et al., 1996 , Tanur, 1992 . If these systematic errors are correlated with enterprise or country-level characteristics, and it is difficult to obtain instruments that are correlated with the explanatory variables but not the systematic errors, results using the indices as dependent variables will be biased.
Consequently, some authors have suggested that although subjective indices might be useful as explanatory variables (although they will still suffer from attenuation bias and when correlated with other explanatory variables, inconsistency), they are less likely to be effective as dependent variables ).
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III.3 Independent Variables
The main variables of interest (see Section II) are: enterprise profitability, overdue payments to workers and utilities, a dummy variable for whether the enterprise is a de novo private enterprise, dummy variables indicating whether the telecommunications and power companies have been privatized, a variable representing the number of cellular operators in the country, and a the number of fixed telephone lines per 1000 people (as an indicator of capacity constraints in telecommunications sector).
9 Some studies have found evidence consistent with this. For example, Oldenberg (1987) describes the land consolidation program in villages in U.P. in Northern India, suggesting that there may be discrepancies between personal assessment about corruption frequency and its actual incidence (Bardhan, 1997) . Measurement error might be especially problematic when studies include fixed country effects (see ).
10 One of the most comprehensive and interesting studies of the cross-national determinants of corruption is Treisman (2000) He offers three justifications for the use of these indices: (1) the Transparency International Ratings are highly correlated among themselves, (2) they are also highly correlated among themselves across years, and (3) in a footnote, "a third reason, of course, is that there are no objective data on the extent of corruption."
Although balance sheets and profit-loss statements were not collected as part of the WBES, the survey did include a question asking about the enterprise's margin on its main product line (i.e., unit price less operating costs as percent of operating costs). In the absence of other information, we use this as a proxy for profitability. In addition, although the WBES asked about the extent to which the enterprise had payments that were overdue by more than 90 days, the responses were qualitative rather than quantitative. Consequently the variables used to represent overdue payments to utilities and workers are index variables, with larger numbers representing higher overdue payments.
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In addition to characteristics of the enterprise paying the bribe, the analysis also includes characteristics of the utilities, the enterprises receiving the bribe payments. We mostly focus on telecommunications providers for two reasons. First, competition and privatization was more advanced in the telecommunications sector than in other utility sectors. For example, the entrance of cellular companies in the telecommunications sector has resulted in considerable competition in telecommunications. In contrast, competition in electricity is embryonic in most developing countries and competition in the water sector is almost non-existent. Second, the WBES does not provide geographic information on firm location. Since other utility services (e.g., electricity and water) are more likely to be provided on a regional basis, it is generally harder to measure service in other sectors.
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The empirical analysis includes several variables related to privatization, competition, and capacity. First, it includes two dummy variables indicating whether electricity distribution and fixed line telephony are privately owned. We focus on the distribution utilities in the electricity sector, because these are the enterprises that will interface with the (mostly small) enterprises in the WBES sample. As a proxy for competition, we include a variable representing the number of cellular companies operating in the country. This variable should provide a better measure of competition in the telecommunications sector than the number of fixed-line 11 The scale in the questionnaire is as follows: 1-substantial amount [of overdue payments]; 2 -Manageable amount; 3 -Modest amount; and 4 -none. We reverse the scale so large numbers mean greater overdue payments (i.e., 5 -the amount on questionnaire).
operators. Even when there are multiple fixed-line operators, local monopoly provision of service is likely -in contrast, cellular operators often compete locally with fixed line operators (see Li and Xu, 2001 ). Finally, we include a variable indicating the number of fixed lines per 1000 people as a measure of capacity.
In addition to the variables discussed above, the model includes several additional enterprise and country-level controls. The additional enterprise level variables include a series of dummies representing ownership (foreign, privatized, de novo private, government and managers or employees), sales growth, and a series of dummy variables representing sector of operations. A series of dummies representing enterprise size are also included. As noted previously, only categorical data on enterprise size is available, rather than actual number of employees (or actual sales). We use the number of employees to measure enterprise size, since it is easier to compare employees across countries than accounting measures such as sales.
However, results are robust to using different measures of size (e.g., dummies based upon sales, assets and debt).
Since the incentives of an individual to be corrupt depend on how many other people are corrupt (Andvig, 1991) , either because the moral cost of corruption is lower or because the likelihood of being detected is lower in more corrupt societies due to limited resource on law enforcement, bribes in the utility sector might be higher in countries where other forms of corruption are more common. As noted earlier, a large literature discusses the determinants of the overall level of corruption in a country. First, several authors have argued that the corruption might be higher in countries where economic rents are higher. Consequently, we might expect corruption to be lower in more competitive economies (Ades and Di Tella, 1999 , RoseAckerman, 1978 . 13 To control for this, our base regression includes variables similar to those used in previous studies -the ratio of imports to GDP (to measure competition) and the ratio of mineral, fuel and metal exports to total exports (to measure rents).
Second, corruption tends to be lower in countries with political institutions that highlight political accountability and give voice to voters.
14 Therefore, we include an index variable representing political rights. Third, corruption might be lower in countries that are growing more rapidly. 15 When growth is faster, talent will tend to flow to productive instead of the rentseeking sectors and, therefore, we might expect corruption to be lower in countries that are growing faster. Finally, we include per capita GDP to try to control for the overall level of economic and institutional development in the country.
IV. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION
IV.1 Empirical Specification
In the empirical analysis, it is assumed that the bribe (B ij ) that the enterprise pays (as a share of revenues) to telecommunications and electricity utilities in country j is a function of enterprise characteristics (x ij ), characteristics of the utilities (u j ), country-level characteristics or country-level fixed effects (z j ) and a normally distributed unobserved error term (H ij ):
The likelihood function for the model where ranges for bribes are calculated is:
The likelihood function for the model with a dummy variable indicating whether a bribe was paid or not is:
) is the standard normal distribution, b * is a dummy variable indicating that the enterprise paid bribes to utilities, b h is the upper bound on the range of bribe payments and b L is the lower bound. Both models are estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. To test the robustness of the enterprise-level results, we also estimate models with country-level fixed effects replacing the country-level variables.
Although direct reverse causality seems highly unlikely in the context of the estimationit is difficult to believe that bribe payments made a small individual firm included in the survey will have a direct effect on privatization decisions in the utility sector -it is possible that there could be omitted country-level characteristics that are correlated with governments' decisions regarding privatization and competition and with the overall level of corruption in a country.
Although the macroeconomic variables included in the country-level regressions should significantly reduce this problem (and the country-level fixed effects mostly eliminate it with respect to the enterprise-level variables), it is possible that some concern might remain especially with respect to the country-level variables. One particular concern is that the macroeconomic variables might not fully control for the quality of the institutional or business environment (e.g., the rule of law). If the quality of the institutional environment affects the government's decision concerning privatization and competition in the utility sector and the overall level of corruption in the country, the point estimates of the coefficients on the privatization and competition variables might not be consistent.
To try to reduce these concerns, we test the robustness of the main results to the inclusion of a large number of institutional, political and additional macroeconomic variables that might affect both the overall level of corruption and governments' decisions regarding privatization and competition. These include a series of controls designed to directly measure the quality of the institutional environment, including measures of the extent of the rule of law, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and government accountability. 16 In addition to 16 These measures are from Kaufmann et al. (2002) . We use the 1997/98 measures, which were constructed with data collected before the WBES was conducted. The wide coverage of these variables makes them preferable to other sources of subjective data on the business environment.
these indirect controls, we also include a subjective measure of the overall level of corruption in the economy in the base regression (i.e., corruption outside of the utility sector).
As well as concerns about omitted variable bias, an additional concern is that error terms might be correlated for enterprises within a single country (e.g., if there are omitted country-level characteristics that affect the bribes paid by all enterprises within a country 
IV.2 Results
The results from the main model specification are presented in column (1) of Table 4 . In the sensitivity analysis, we test the robustness of the main results to the inclusion of additional controls for the quality of the institutional environment, additional country-level variables suggested elsewhere in the literature on the determinants of corruption and to the inclusion of country fixed effects. Throughout the analysis the results are consistent for the probit 17 Moulton (1986) concludes that OLS standard errors are biased downwards when disturbance terms are correlated within groups (i.e., countries). and Deaton (1997, pp. 73-78 ) discuss this issue in detail.
regressions with the dummy variable indicating that the enterprise paid bribes and the interval regression indicating how much the enterprise paid.
Ownership of Utilities. Consistent with the hypothesis that bribes are lower in countries with privately owned utilities, the coefficients on the dummy variables indicating that the fixed line telecommunications and electricity distribution companies are privately owned are negative and statistically significant in both the probit regression with the dummy variable indicating that the firm paid bribes to utility employees as the dependent variable and the interval regression with bribes as share of revenues as the dependent variable (see Table 4 ). Since we control for the effects of competition and capacity constraints, the ownership variables should proxy for the direct effect of utility ownership. The point estimates of the coefficients suggests that utility privatization has a large impact -privatization of the fixed-line telecommunication and electricity distribution companies reduces the probability that the 'average' enterprise would pay bribes to utility companies by 15.1 percentage points and 12.4 percentage points respectively (see Table 5 ). The results from the interval regressions are similar. Bribes were significantly lower -by 0.7 percent and 0.4 percent of revenues respectively -in countries where telecommunications and electricity utilities had been privatized.
Capacity and Competition.
Consistent with the hypothesis that bribes are less common and lower in countries where capacity is less constrained, enterprises in countries with better developed telecommunications systems appear less likely to pay bribes and pay lower amounts than enterprises in countries with less developed systems after controlling for per capita income (see Table 4 ). The coefficient on fixed lines per capita is negative and statistically significant in both regressions. Increasing the number of fixed lines by one percent decreases the probability 18 When we use robust standard errors in the analysis with range as the dependent variable the covariance matrix becomes non-invertible. Although this suggests interpretation of statistical significance for the interval regressions should be treated cautiously, there are several reasons why this might not be a serious concern. First, the results for the range variable are generally consistent with results for the dummy variable, which allow enterprises within countries to have correlated errors. Second, when the dummy variable is the dependent variable, robust standard errors were, on average, only about 30 percent larger for country-level variables and 5 percent larger for enterpriselevel variables in regressions similar to those in column 1 of Table 4 . Finally, results from a random-effects model allowing errors to be correlated for enterprises within countries (i.e., a model that includes country-level random effects), were virtually identical in terms of coefficient size and statistical significance to the results presented in column 2 in Table 4 .
that the average enterprise will pay a bribe to utility employees by about 1.2 percent (see elasticities in Table 6 ).
Consistent with the hypothesis that competition reduces the ability of utility employees to demand bribes, the coefficients on the number of cellular companies are statistically significant and negative in both regressions (see Table 4 ). Increasing the number of cellular companies by one (from two to three cellular companies) reduces the average probability that an enterprise will pay a bribe by 5.1 percentage points and reduces the bribe payment by 0.2 percent of revenues.
Enterprise Performance. More profitable enterprises were more likely to pay bribes to utilities than less profitable enterprises and generally paid higher amounts (see Table 4 ). This is consistent with both the endogenous harassment and speed money theories of corruption and with Svensson's (2003) results for enterprises in Uganda. A one percent increase in margin raises the probability that enterprises report paying bribes to utilities by about 0.2 percent (see Table 6 ). Although the coefficient on sales growth is positive, it is statistically insignificant in many model specifications including the base specification (see Table 4 ). This suggests that utility employees act like "roving bandits" and do not consider inter-temporal schedules for rent extraction.
Ownership of Enterprise Paying Bribe. The base regression (see Table 4 ) includes several dummy variables to control for the ownership of the bribe payer. Most of the coefficients on the dummy variables indicating ownership, including the coefficient on foreignowned and insider-owned (i.e., manager and employee-owned) enterprises are statistically insignificant in both the interval and probit regressions, suggesting that these enterprises are no more likely to pay bribes to utilities than domestically owned privatized enterprises (the default category) and do not generally pay higher amounts. In contrast, the coefficients on the dummy variables indicating that the enterprise is a domestically owned de novo enterprise (i.e., a newly established private enterprise) are statistically significant and positive, suggesting that de novo enterprises are more likely to pay bribes than privatized or state-owned enterprises and also pay higher bribes (as share of revenues). 19 The effect appears to be large in quantitative terms -the probability that de novo private enterprises will pay bribes to utilities is nearly 10 percentage points higher than the probability that other enterprises will, and they pay 0.3 percent more as a share of revenues (see Table 5 ). This is consistent with our hypothesis that de novo private firms are more likely to pay bribes either because they are more profitable -to the extent that the 'margin' fails to fully control for this -and therefore have higher willingness to pay, or because they have less political power and therefore are more vulnerable to bribe threats, or because utility employees, who behave as roving bandits, see them as more risky.
Overdue Payments to Utilities. The positive and statistically significant coefficients on the index variable indicating overdue payments to utilities (where higher values of the index mean greater overdue payments) implies that enterprises with overdue payments to utilities were more likely to pay bribes to utilities than enterprises without overdue payments and paid higher amounts (see Table 4 ). In contrast, the coefficient on overdue payments to workers is statistically insignificant and negative. The coefficient on overdue payments to utilities suggests that an average enterprise with modest overdue payments would be 3 percentage points more likely to pay bribes than a similar enterprise with no overdue payments and would pay 0.2 percent more of revenues (see Table 5 ). These findings suggest that bribe extraction is greater and more likely when the firm is vulnerable to threats by the utility employees.
Enterprise Size. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1999, pp. 125-126) finds that small enterprises in Eastern Europe and Central Asia generally paid higher total bribes (i.e., to all sources not just utilities) than large enterprises. Consistent with this, and even after controlling for other factors, we find that large enterprises were less likely to pay bribes than small enterprises and generally paid lower amounts (as share of revenues). Enterprises with over 500 employees were about 15 percentage points less likely to pay bribes to utilities than enterprises with fewer than 10 employees.
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The main results are robust to the inclusion of 19 This pattern is consistent with the pattern observed for total bribes to government officials (see European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1999, pp. 125-126) . 20 The null hypothesis that enterprises of different sizes are equally likely to pay bribes can be rejected at conventional significance levels (F 2 (5) = 31.49, Prob.> F 2 is 0.00).
categorical variables based upon enterprise sales, assets and debt rather than number of employees (see Table 7 ).
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Macroeconomic and Political Controls. Since the overall level of corruption in a given country might affect the level of bribes paid to utilities, the analysis also includes some macroeconomic and political variables that might affect corruption in other areas. To avoid problems associated with reverse causation, the macroeconomic and political controls are lagged at least one year. Given the relatively modest number of countries in this analysis, it is possible to include only a small number of the many variables suggested in the literature in the base regression.
The coefficients on the control variables included in the base regression are generally statistically significant with signs consistent with theory and previous analyses. Enterprise are less likely to pay bribes to utilities and pay lower amounts in countries with higher levels of democracy; that are more open to imports; where exports of natural resources are less important and where growth is faster. After controlling for these variables, the coefficient on (the log of) per capita GDP is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Although most control variables are available for the entire sample, exports of minerals, metals and fuel was not available for either Ukraine or Uzbekistan. However, the coefficients of interest, other than the coefficient on the number of cellular companies, remain significant when we replace this variable with a variable indicating per capita oil reserves in the country (see Table 7 , under the heading "institutional variables" and "additional political variables"), which is available for the entire sample. The pairwise correlation between oil reserves and mineral, fuel and metal exports is very high (0.9) for the 19 countries for which both variables are available.
IV.3 Robustness Checks
Controlling for the quality of the institutional environment. One concern is that utility privatization and the introduction of competition in cellular telephony might be more common in countries with good institutional or business environments. If corruption is higher in these 21 Enterprises are put into eleven categories for each of sales, assets and debt.
countries, this could result in a spurious correlation between utility privatization and competition and bribes paid to the utilities. The country-level variables already included in the analysis should significantly reduce this concern. However, we now go one step further by adding several additional variables to the base regression in an attempt to control for the quality of the institutional environment even better. The additional variables include variables to control for the rule of law, political stability, government efficiency, regulatory quality, and government accountability. We include these variables both singly and as a group. In addition to this, we also add additional variables to control for other political factors such as the level of democracy and whether the country has a parliamentary system. The main results, including the results for the privatization and competition variables, are robust to the inclusion of these additional variables (see Table 7 under the headings 'Institutional Variables' and 'Additional Political Variables'). 22 Further, the coefficients on the institutional and political variables are statistically insignificant in all but one case, suggesting that the country-level variables in the base regression adequately control for the quality of the institutional environment.
Including additional Country-Level and Macroeconomic Variables.
Over the past decade, many studies have looked at country level variables that might affect the overall level of corruption. Although most of these determinants would not be expected to affect corruption in the utility sector per se, to the extent that they affect the overall level of the corruption in the country, they might have an indirect effect on corruption in the utility sector. If these omitted characteristics are correlated with the other country-level variables, this could lead to omitted variable bias. Given the relatively modest number of countries in the sample (see footnote 7) and the large literature on the potential determinants of corruption, it would be impossible to simultaneously include all possible regressors in a single regression. However, to check robustness, we add many of these variables -including regional dummies, inflation, factors that might affect natural openness, measures of the extent of taxation and government spending, and a measure of the extent of decentralization -to the base regression (i.e., column 1 of Table 4 ). In addition, we also include a subjective measure of corruption in the regression as an additional 22 The dependent variable for the regressions in Table 7 is the dummy variable indicating that the enterprise reported paying bribes. However, results are similar when the range variable is used as the dependent variable. The main robustness check. 23 For the most part, the coefficients on the additional variables are statistically insignificant and have little impact on the main results (see Table 7 under the heading "overall level of corruption" and "other country and macroeconomic controls").
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Country-Level Fixed Effects. Although the base regression contained country-level variables to try to control for systematic differences between countries in the region, it is possible that they might not adequately control for systematic differences between countries. To check the robustness of the enterprise-level results while controlling for cross-country differences more completely, we add country dummies to the base regression. Since the country-level variables are collinear with these dummy variables, country level variables have to be dropped. This prevents us from addressing many of the interesting questions related to the country-level variables in this part of the analysis.
For the most part, the enterprise-level results are robust to the inclusion of the fixed effects. The coefficients on margin and overdue payments to utilities remain positive and statistically significant in both the probit and interval regressions. In addition, the coefficient on variable indicating that the enterprise is a de novo private enterprise remains statistically significant in the probit regression. 25 difference is that the coefficient on the electricity privatization dummy becomes statistically insignificant in some model specifications. Results for the interval regressions are available from the authors upon request.
23 Some variables suggested in the literature are omitted from the sensitivity analysis because there is insufficient variation (e.g., no countries in the sample were former British colonies), while others are omitted because there is insufficient data available for the countries in the sample (e.g., measures of ethno-linguistic fractionalization). 24 Results are similar when these variables added to the base regression for the interval regressions. The main difference is that the coefficient on the electricity privatization dummy is statistically insignificant in about half of the model specifications in the interval regressions. Results are available from the authors upon request. The negative coefficient on progress with privatization suggests that corruption is lower in countries that have privatized more (i.e., with higher scores on the EBRD's index of privatization). If privatization increases competition throughout the economy, it might be correlated with lower levels of corruption. This interpretation is consistent with results from previous studies (see, e.g., Ades and Di Tella, 1999 ) that find that openness to imports, which might also increase competition, is correlated with lower corruption. 25 One difference is that two other controls become statistically significant once the country dummies are added.
The positive coefficient on sales growth suggests that faster growing enterprises are more likely to pay bribes to utility companies than slower-growing enterprises. This is again consistent with our earlier discussion that utility employees act more like "roving bandits" than "stationary bandits" and are more concerned with short-term rent extractions. The negative coefficients on the dummy variable indicating that largest shareholder is the government suggests that state-owned enterprises are less likely to pay bribes than other enterprises and that they generally pay lower amounts than other enterprises.
Country-Level Regressions.
To test the robustness of the country-level results -and in particular as an additional check whether correlated errors between enterprises within countries has led us to underestimate standard errors in the enterprise-level analysis -we also present results from cross-country regressions using the percentage of enterprises reporting paying bribes to utilities as the dependent variable (see Table 8 ). 26 Since this sharply reduces sample size, it is not surprising that significance levels tend to be lower in this part of the analysis. However, several of the main results are robust to even this change. First, utility privatization still appears to be associated with a reduction in corruption within the sector. The percentage of firms reported paying bribes to utilities was 11 percent lower in countries where the fixed line telecommunications provider had been privatized, and about 15 percent lower in countries where electricity distribution is privatized, although the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating that electricity distribution is privatized becomes statistically insignificant at conventional levels.
The coefficient on capacity also remains statistically significant and negative. In contrast, the coefficient on the number of cellular companies becomes statistically insignificant at conventional levels. These results are robust to substituting per capita oil reserves for fuel, mineral and metal exports (both proxies for the importance of natural resources in the economy and the potential for economic rents), which increases sample size by two countries.
V. CONCLUSION
Rather than discussing the political, macroeconomic and cultural factors that affect the overall level of corruption, this paper primarily focuses on how characteristics of firms paying and receiving bribes affect the equilibrium level of bribes in the utility sector. Our conceptual framework suggests that characteristics of bribe takers (i.e., the rents available for extraction in the utility sector, the extent of competition in the sector and the penalty functions faced by utility employees) and bribe payers (i.e., the firm's willingness to pay bribes, the leverage that bribe takers have over the bribe payers, and the length of the payers relationship with the takers)
should both be important. Further, the multiple-equilibria nature of corruption (Bardhan, 1997) means that bribe payments in the utility sector should be higher in countries where the overall level of corruption is higher.
The empirical evidence from a survey of around 2000 enterprises in 21 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is remarkably consistent with the conceptual framework. On the side of bribe payers, enterprises that are more profitable, enterprises that have greater overdue payments to utilities and de novo private firms appear to pay higher bribes. These results are robust to the inclusion of many additional country-level variables and to the inclusion of country-level fixed effects.
The result regarding overdue payments to utilities is interesting because it emphasizes that corruption cannot be measured simply by asking enterprises or individuals about the burden of corruption. 27 Although it is unclear whether the enterprise with overdue payments initiated the bribe or merely responded to demands from the utility employee, it suggests that the enterprise manager preferred to pay the bribe rather than the overdue bill. Although this might seem an efficient outcome (i.e., both the enterprise and the utility employee benefited), this is not necessarily the case since the negotiations excluded the parties that end up paying the cost of supplying utility services to enterprise in the event of non-payment (e.g., the utility's owners, taxpayers, or other utility customers). When bribes are used to pass costs onto others, questions that equate the societal cost of corruption with the cost to enterprises could lead to incorrect conclusions regarding the relative burden imposed by corruption.
We also find strong evidence that bribes to utilities are lower in countries with greater capacity and competition in the utility sector and where utilities has been privatized. Although there is a concern that this correlation might be because countries with stronger institutional environments find it easier to introduce competition and privatize state-owned utilities and also have fewer problems related to corruption, these results are highly robust to the inclusion of additional variables to control for the quality of the institutional, macroeconomic, and business 27 For example, the WBES includes a question that reads "Can you tell me how problematic [corruption is] for the operation and growth of your business." environment. Finally, macroeconomic and political factors that contribute to higher corruption at the national level also appear to increase bribes in the utility sector.
The results from this study suggest that countries can reduce corruption through changing the incentives of bribe takers such as market-friendly policies like utility privatization and increased competition. In addition to reducing corruption by easing capacity constraints, privatization might improve internal incentives to reduce corruption while competition might reduce the utilities' ability to demand bribes from enterprises using their services. Steps to reduce corruption in one sector might also have beneficial side effects on the overall level of corruption, due to the multiple equilibria nature of corruption.
This result on the corruption-reducing effect of privatization might appear to contradict the findings in Glaeser (2001) , which suggest that the wave of utility nationalization in the early 20 th century was intended to reduce corruption. Glaeser (2001) suggests that private firms relying significantly on the government as buyer or seller have strong incentives to bribe government officials. In contrast, public firms have much weaker incentives because managers face the risk associated with corruption but fail to reap the benefits. While these arguments, and the empirical results in the paper might appear to run counter to our findings and hypotheses, this is not the case. Most notably, this study looks at petty corruption (i.e., utility employees taking bribes from customers), finding that utility privatization is associated with utility employees receiving lower bribes from utility customers. In contrast, Glaeser (2001) discusses grand corruption (i.e., government bureaucrats or politicians taking bribes from utility managers), finding that privatization is associated with utility companies paying higher bribes to government officials. Both approaches postulate that stronger profit incentives for private utility companies affects corruption. In our case, the stronger incentives lead utility managers to crackdown on employee diversion of company money; in Glaeser's (2001) case, they lead to attempts by company managers to bribe government officials to receive better business deals. If both results are correct, privatization leads to an interesting tradeoff that is unnoticed by the existing literature: privatization might increase grand corruption (i.e., bribe payments to government officials and bureaucrats by utility managers), but decrease petty corruption (i.e., bribe payments to utility employees by service-using firms). 
VI. TABLES
Hypothesis
Characteristics of bribe takers (utility companies):
Capacity Constraints H1: When constraints on capacity are greater, connections will be more valuable and bribes will therefore be higher.
Utility privatization H2: Privatization increases capacity and strengthens managerial incentives to monitor corruption of bribe employees, thus reducing bribes.
Competition in the utility sector H3: Competition in the utility sector reduces bribes by raising utility capacity and allowing customers to shift to other providers when encountering demands for bribes.
Characteristics of bribe givers (enterprises)
Firm profitability H4: More profitable firms are more likely to pay bribes either because they have higher willingness to pay or because the service provider can endogenously extract more bribes.
Overdue payments to utilities H5: Overdue utility payments weaken the firm's bargaining position vis-à-vis the utility, increasing the ability of utility employees to demand bribes and increase the firm's willingness-to-pay bribes (to avoid having to pay their utility bills). Consequently, we would expect overdue payments to utilities to be positively associated with bribes after controlling for profitability and cash flow.
Overdue payments to workers H6: After adequately controlling for profitability and cash flow, overdue payments should not affect bribes because (i) they do not affect the bargaining position of the firm, (ii) they are difficult for utility employees to observe, and (iii) they do not affect the firm's willingness to pay for utility service. If the measures of firm profitability are not adequate controls for the firm's willingness to pay, overdue payments to worker might be negatively correlated with bribes.
De Novo Private Enterprises
H7: De novo private firms pay more bribes because they are more profitable and therefore have higher willingness to pay; have less political influence, and the higher risk of bankruptcy makes the utility employee more likely to behave like a "roving bandit".
Firm growth H8: If utility employees behave like 'stationary bandits', firm growth might reduce bribe payments. However, it is unlikely that utility employee could internalize the differential effects of current bribes and therefore unlikely that they will behave in this way. Further, if firm growth signals high willingness to pay bribes (after controlling for other factors), then fast growing firms might actually pay higher bribes than other enterprises. The relationship between bribes and firm growth is likely an ambiguous one. Note: Data is for 1998, except where noted and for data from Beck, et al (2001) and Heritage Foundation (1997) , which are from 1997 since data for 1998 were not available. Standard errors are Huber-White standard errors allowing firms' error terms within countries to be correlated (i.e., 'clustered' errors at the country level) for regressions in columns 1 and 3. T-statistics are in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 10 percent level. a Regressions include 6 dummies for enterprise size based upon employment. The categories are: enterprises with fewer than 10 (full-time) employees; between 10 and 49 employees; between 50 and 99 employees; between 100 and 199 employees; between 200 and 499 employees and over 500 employees.
b Regressions include seven dummies based upon sector of operations. The categories are: manufacturing; agriculture; other industry; retail and wholesale trade; transportation; other services; and other.
c See footnote 7 for list of countries. Table 4 and changes are evaluated at the means of all other variables. a An increase from 2 to 3 cellular companies.
b An increase from 'no' to 'modest' arrears. c An decrease in freedom from 3 to 4 on the Freedom House 7-point scale. The "base" row reports the sign and significance level of key variables based on Column (1) of 
